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Chapter I 
Moving International Law from Theory to 
Practice: the Role of Military Manuals in 
Effectuating the Law of Armed Conflict 
by 
W. Michael Reisman* and William K. Leitzau** 
M ilit~ry man~als and handbo~ks cont~~ning ope,:ation~ t:Ules prescribed by mternatlonal law (heremafter manuals ) are tmportant to the 
operation of the international legal system for two related reasons. First, they 
are the indispensable modality for disseminating normative information to 
those whose behavior is the target of the norms in question. Second, they 
are an essential component in the international lawmaking process, often the 
litmus test of whether a putative prescriptive exercise has produced effective 
law. Without adequate dissemination, this putative international lawmaking 
is an exercise in the elaboration of myth through lex simulata1 rather than the 
installation of an effective operational code. 
There is a developmental aspect to both of these properties in the sense 
that if they are effectuated adequately, they contribute to the operation of 
the sector of international law concerned with armed conflict. There is, as 
well, a necessarily comparative aspect to inquiry about these properties in 
that this area of law, even more than others, depends for its vigor on 
reciprocity. Unless there is a comparable and manifest "scoring" on the 
manuals (or their functional equivalents) of adversaries, the symmetry 
necessary for reciprocity will be absent and the norms with which they are 
concerned are unlikely to be effectively incorporated into international legal 
practice. 
I. Military Manuals As A Mode of Dissemination 
A. The Importance of Dissemination 
In small groups and micro-communities, the same persons who make law, 
act on it, apply it and enforce it.2 But, as Durkheim observed, the large social 
organizations characteristic of most sectors of modem life require labor and 
role divisions and refined task specializations} As a result, it is not only 
probable that entirely different persons will make law, act on it, apply it and 
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enforce it, but it is also likely that there will be considerable temporal and 
social distance between the specialists performing each of these functions. 
The phenomenon is not unique to international law. In the United States, 
the Supreme Court encounters much the same problem. James Levine writes, 
The conditions necessary for Supreme Court efficacy are much more stringent when 
the people and institutions to be controlled are farther removed from the Court's range 
of command and less threatened by the force of its sanctions. It is much easier for the 
Supreme Court to curb a few cantankerous federal judges than to reallocate the 
fundamental values of the society.4 
"Causal distance," as Levine styles it, can be an even greater problem in the 
more complex international political system. 
In large social organizations, effective lawmaking requires an additional 
step: the efficient dissemination and effectiye internalization of authoritative 
norms in those persons "in the field" as it were, whose behavior is the target 
of the norm in question. The process of dissemination is a necessary component 
of any communication that extends beyond the mediation of subjectivities 
between two proximate persons. It can be most economically expressed in 
terms of Harold D. Lasswell's classic paradigm of Who/What/Whom/ How/ 
Results/Effects. Less cryptically, Lasswell's heuristic asks for pertinent 
information to be organized in terms of: 
Who is communicating (Communicators) 
What (Content) 
To whom (Target Audiences) 
Through what channels (Channels) 
With what results (Immediately Changed Subjectivities) 
And with what longer term effects (Long Term Changed Subjectivities}.5 
When information is so organized, the aggregate consequences of a 
communication are clarified and the factors that accounted for success or 
failure may be analyzed, appraised and made the subject of policy 
recommendations. 
Our focal content is the law of armed conflict and related internationally 
prescribed norms. Audiences may vary depending upon the type of activity 
sought to be regulated. Decisions about the use of nuclear weapons, for 
example, are unlikely to be made by men and women in the ranks. 
Dissemination of norms regarding nuclear weapons employment should 
therefore target higher military and political echelons. Comparative 
examinations of manuals must take account of variables such as these. 
We are concerned with identifying channels because, as is well known, 
human beings mediate subjectivities on different levels and with varying 
degrees of explicitness. As we will see, contrary messages about prescribed 
behavior may be modulated simultaneously through different channels. We 
are concerned with results, for lawmaking is not a form of communication 
that is ritualistic, with its social functions fulfllled by the action of 
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communication itself. It is designed to precipitate social results. To the extent 
that it fails to do this, the entire exercise has failed. We are concerned with 
longer term effects because prescriptive communications also shape 
perspectives about the constitutive process6 and value regulations other than 
those which have been manifestly targeted. 
In a socially meaningful sense, then, the making oflaw necessarily involves 
much more than the clarification and establishment of some community policy 
in authoritative form. If law is to be effective, it must be transmitted and, 
where necessary, translated into formulations appropriate for those operating 
in the field whose behavior is the ultimate target of the principles in question. 
This process, which has been variously described as promulgation, 
dissemination, implementation, or publication, is a necessary step if law is 
to be transformed from an exercise in theory to a matter of practice.7 
Unless a large number of those who are the target of particular formulations 
become familiar with and internalize the norms in question, the entire burden 
of enforcement is shifted to appliers and is greatly magnified. Their resources 
are limited, however, and would hardly suffice for such an enormous task. 
Moreover, if the norms they are asked to apply have not been internalized 
by a large part of the community, their actions appear arbitrary, retroactive 
and ex post facto and undermine rather than reinforce the symbol of law.8 
Though many legal systems insist that ignorantia legis haud excusat, all seem to 
appreciate that the point of legislative exercises is not to punish those who 
prove to be ignorant of the law. It is to get the message across beforehand 
to those who are expected to adjust their behavior in accordance with the 
norm.9 
Dissemination can also precipitate the reciprocal consequence. Where an 
international prescription has been internalized at the rank-and-fIle level, it 
may serve to limit violations among the elites themselves. Even when 
prescriptive violations appear to serve short-term special interests, elites may 
find that there is rank-and-fIle resistance to norm repudiations. In effect, by 
disseminating rules of warfare, national command authorities raise the costs 
of violating those rules both in peace and war. Essentially, they are divesting 
themselves of power in return for other expected gains. Policy changes must 
first be communicated to the appropriate field authorities and then 
disseminated to relevant actors-in some cases the individual troops. Even 
if successfully communicated, the cost of deviating from a known policy is 
much greater than that of simply reversing a govemment-to-government 
statement. Neither personal demands for rectitude nor notions of chivalry 
are dead among military personnel. Moreover, the effectiveness of military 
units depends on leadership which exemplifies integrity. 
The point merits emphasis. Dissemination not only internalizes norms 
within the domestic system; it internalizes them within the members of a 
warrior class who take their profession seriously. This is not to say that soldiers 
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can not be made to violate international law; some will predictably do so 
in violation of orders. What effective dissemination does mean, however, is 
that the default position is set in favor of accepted norms, and the costs of 
resetting will have to be weighed. 
B. Methods of Dissemination 
Law, like all types oflearned behavior, can be transmitted in many, not 
necessarily exclusive ways: by single or repetitive communication, in manifest 
or latent forms, by precept and example, by positive or negative 
reinforcement, etc. Transmission can be relatively simple and single-step, for 
example, publication in an official gazette, or complex and multi-step as in 
a sequential opinion-formation process. Each phase may be inhabited and! 
or dominated by different specialist groups which are expected to interpret, 
digest and formulate the message in ways that make it comprehensible and 
practicable to the level they are serving. 
Each phase of the transmission process may, in turn, become a sub-power-
arena, in which politically relevant social forces bring to bear whatever bases 
of power are relevant in the setting in order to secure an interpretation and 
refashioning of the authorized policy that discriminates in their own favor.1° 
In politics, as its practitioners know, there is no end to politics and, as the 
adage puts it, "nothing is finished until it's done." 
Consider, by way of example, the sequence of linkages by which the 
Supreme Court's ruling in Mirandall filtered down from the Supreme Court, 
through the law enforcement bureaucracy, to the policemen on the beat. 
Institutional interpreters at different levels acted as mediators between the 
Court, with its general policy objective, and the actual law enforcement 
officers. The mediators, sensitive to contexts of application in ways in which 
the Court could not have been, introduced nuanced changes as they 
reformulated the Miranda doctrine into an operational code. There were many 
steps in this translation, involving attorneys in the Department of Justice, in 
many local police departments reflecting regional diversities, and finally 
commanding officers and police officers in lower grades. Before the principles 
became established, there were numerous feedback loops and challenges to 
the courts, with reinterpretations of various sorts.12 Academies and private 
interest groups made their power felt at many points. The media played an 
important role, both in transmitting the normative content of Miranda and 
its social importance, while firmly anchoring it in folklore. The point of 
emphasis is that a sequence of steps of this sort is indispensable if formal 
prescriptions are to be even minimally effective. 
The dissemination of general normative information to the modern military 
is substantially the same as dissemination to any other sub-specialized 
organization. Hence one will not be surprised to discover, at the constitutive 
level, authorized channels for dissemination,13 authorized symbols denoting 
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normative information and its level of importance14 and, at lower and more 
mundane levels, the handbooks, manuals and loose-leaf collections15 so 
symptomatic of large, contemporary social organizations operating in the 
fluid environments that are the quintessence of modernity. 
But the dissemination of international legal information and, in particular, 
that part of it now known as the "law of armed conflict" makes the military 
organization distinctive. The dissemination of normative information is 
ordinarily eufunctional, incorporating and reinforcing the organization's 
authority. In contrast, the dissemination of the law of armed conflict in the 
military is (i) premised on a distinct supra-organizational authority, that is 
(ii) assumed to be competent to prescribe behavior which by deftnition 
contributes to the operation of the larger system but, at the same time, limits 
and may even undermine the particular military organization which has 
incorporated it. An important element of this presc;ribed behavior is 
reciprocity, which must sometimes be ascertained by the actors subject to 
the norms. Thus, the disseminating scheme is of critical signiftcance in this 
context, for it represents the closest parallel to an "act" which can verify 
national intent. Moreover, it is the only means to achieve deterrence, since 
there are few opportunities for employment of "example" in which a post 
hoc violation/punishment nexus can be observed. Hence dissemination of 
normative information in the military setting is marked by simultaneous 
contrary organizational dynamics in which some authoritative elements are 
pressing for compliance while others are resisting it.t6 
These unique features of the law of armed conflict are important in 
comparative appraisals of dissemination. Precisely because there are strong 
organizational dynamics militating against norm implementation, 
dissemination must be contextually and systematically analyzed, not simply 
acknowledged via a perfunctory check for the presence or absence of a manual 
containing certain verbal formulae. Unless information in the manuals is 
accompanied by secondary guidance or metacommunications indicating the 
gravity and preeminence of the information, and the transmission is embedded 
in an enforcement system which is adequate and vigilant, manuals themselves 
mean nothing. And unless comparable manuals are in operation and in 
evidence in the different latent war communities, much of the normative 
information in the manuals may not be acted upon.t? 
One may, then, examine the effectiveness of a military manual in terms 
of content, mode of delivery, the secondary norms establishing its relative 
position in the effective normative hierarchy, its system of enforcement and 
reciprocity. Let us consider each of these components briefly. 
(i) Content: We are not interested in the existence of a manual on 
the simple-minded assumption that all manuals are the same.t8 Of critical 
importance is the specific content of the manual under examination in terms 
of more generally prescribed international norms. It is not enough to develop 
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a mechanical checklist to verify that certain items are in the manual. How 
they are translated into the pertinent vernacular and with what nuance and 
shading are also important. Content must be examined not only in terms of 
what is manifest in a particular manual, but in terms of the aggregate of orders 
about action putatively regulated by the law of armed conflict. Consideration 
should also be given to the relative ease with which a provision could be 
perversely construed to allow for self-serving interpretations in the future. 
In short, inquiry must identify the larger, functional manual and not only 
the words enclosed by pasteboard covers on which the word "manual" is 
emblazoned. Training publications and other instructional material regarding 
tactics may, for example, implicate referenced norms. If, by way of 
hypothesis, classified orders were to state that, on the occurrence of certain 
contingencies, those orders come into operation and override normative 
material that is found in any other communication, those orders would have 
to be considered part of the manual. 
(ii) Mode of Delivery or Vehicle: Normative information may be 
conveyed in many forms. The advantage of a manual, especially in a 
hierarchical setting, is that it is relatively precise and unchanging, allowing 
for standardization and clarity in communication and ease in ascription of 
responsibility. It is also relatively easy to disseminate.19 Each operative may 
be given a complete manual. The test is not satisfied, however, unless the 
content of the manual is in fact disseminated to the appropriate levels in 
credible fashion.20 Timing here can be of moment since early indoctrination 
might stimulate more resistance to a potential violation. 
Equally relevant, a manual simplifies international surveillance. While one 
should resist elevating form over substance, form here is of decided 
importance. Written prescriptions have a permanence which makes 
repudiation observable even to those not targeted by the dissemination.21 
There is a greater political cost involved in violations which are inconsistent 
with previous governmental statements. On the other hand, there are military 
organizations or situations in which manuals may be inappropriate. Where, 
for example, officers and ranks are illiterate or semi-literate, other vehicles 
for dissemination must be sought.22 Likewise, dissemination should take 
account of the decision-making level of the target. Each sailor, for example, 
need not possess a manual explaining the juridical bay concept. 
(iii) Secondary Norms: Unless a manual is identified by secondary 
norms within the organization as of transcending importance, it is not worth 
the paper on which it is printed. The key norms in this regard are, first, the 
preeminence of international law over national law and second, that superior 
orders do not constitute a defense to a violation of international law. These 
secondary norms must be effective. Here again, words do not suffice. The 
expectations of the effectiveness of norms are sustained and reinforced by 
the availability of manifest and credible methods of implementation; norms 
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erode into lex simulata if it becomes apparent that there is neither means nor 
will to implement them. During combat, the more proximate authority and 
control system will prevail over the more distant. Hence, from a practical 
standpoint, it is important that the substantive content of the international 
norm be incorporated before conflict. This will constitute effective 
superordination of international over nationallaw.23 
(iv) Systems of Enforcement: There must be an environing 
indigenous system of enforcement of the norms which is sufficiently manifest 
and efficient to become part of the expectation pattern of those whose 
behavior is the target of the norms in question. This component is closely 
tied to that of secondary norms in that it is the domestic enforcement system 
which gives teeth to the acknowledged preeminence of internationallaw.24 
(v) Reciprocity: The military organization must provide for an 
accurate method for determining whether adversarial behavior is reciprocal 
where reciprocity is an element of continuing validity.25 It is important that 
there be distinctions between the inevitable single unauthorized violations 
of prescribed norms, on the one hand, which should not authorize suspension 
of the norms by the other party, and systematic authorized violations, which 
should warrant suspension.26 Without the means for making such distinctions, 
certain norms are likely to be suspended shortly after the first shot is fired.27 
On the basis of the foregoing factors, comparative appraisals of the 
effectiveness of military manuals may be expressed in terms of a general 
quotient. More importantly, these distinct inquiries may be useful in terms 
of identifying pathologies with particularity and targeting them for 
appropriate remedies. 
II. Military Manuals As Part Of The Process 
Of Making International Law 
In addition to their important function in dissemination and transmission 
of international legal information, manuals are an important mode for making 
international law as well as evidencing its existence. 
Lawmaking, in any setting, involves the determination and communication 
of normative information accompanied by authorizing symbols and credible 
indications of control intention. In organized national systems, the popular 
and scholarly conception of this activity has involved prescription through 
legislatures and other highly institutionalized prescribing modes. 
Consensual international law is essentially made in two ways: by explicit 
agreement and by implicit agreement-which is usually referred to as custom. 
Explicit agreement includes treaties, the classic mode, as well as many newer 
methods involving explicit clarification of policy in an organized arena. 
Implicit agreement includes all the modes by which authoritative policy is 
informally arrived at and intercommunicated. 
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With regard to international law concerning the conduct of military 
conflict, manuals are important in both modes. Even when norms are 
prescribed in formal settings, a critical phase in their consolidation is national 
incorporation. Because international law notoriously lacks its own 
enforcement system, national implementation is often a critical factor in 
successful international lawmaking. The content of manuals, while not 
absolutely probative that particular international norms are being effected 
at the national level, is a conditio sine qua non for their implementation. 
Certainly, both the absence of a manual or the use of manuals whose content 
does not include the relevant norms would strongly suggest that those norms 
have not been adopted.28 
Manuals play an. even larger role in processes of implicit agreement. In 
the international system, as is well known, the bulk of international 
prescription is accomplished through processes which are informal and non-
institutionalized. The critical building block in these processes is national 
action. It is not surprising that the u.s. Military Tribunal at Nuremburg stated 
that while not in themselves a competent source of international law, "[army 
regulations], as they bear upon a question of custom and practice in the 
conduct of war, might have evidentiary value, particularly if the applicable 
portions had been put into general practice. "29 Customary law is even more 
significant to the law of naval warfare since, it has been argued, attempts 
to codify norms relevant to land warfare have historically enjoyed more 
success than similar attempts regarding naval warfare.30 
Some international norms are formed by homologous national action. 
Consider The Scotia case31 in which Justice Strong ruled in favor of a British 
ship which had collided with an American vessel. He found that British orders 
regarding navigational lights had in fact become international law. 
Homologous national action may be evidenced in manuals or their functional 
equivalent.32 Given the competitive character of their enterprise, specialists 
in adversary organizations will scrutinize the operational codes of their 
opponents to determine whether particular international norms have been 
adopted and put into effect.33 The extent to which they have will obviously 
influence the willingness of others to adopt and act on them. 
The chivalric code of the Middle Ages was largely generated in this fashion. 
Since a vast majority of warriors, like the population at large, were illiterate, 
a written manual would have been pointless. Functional manuals transmitted 
authorized norms of warfare through a familiar oral tradition. Froissart 
recorded a fourteenth century incident which evidences the existence of this 
functional manual. Upon surrender, three French knights gave themselves to 
their English captors saying, "We are yours: you have vanquished us. Act 
therefore to the law of arms."34 
A number of norms in the contemporary law of armed conflict may be 
traced to this pattern oflawmaking. Even in antiquity rules of warfare were 
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often orally disseminated to troops. Cyrus, King of Persia (559 B.C.), 
Alexander the Great (333 B.C.), and Titus of Rome (70 B.C.) all insisted that 
their troops observe basic humanitarian rules such as sparing civilian 
populations and property and respecting religious buildings.35 Protection of 
enemy wounded and prisoners of war can also be traced to earlier oral codes.36 
For the latent lawmaking function no less than for the immediate operation 
of the laws of armed conflict, it is important that manuals be made available 
to potential adversaries.37 Ironically, however, notifying an adversary 
regarding battlefield intentions may yield strategic or tactical advantages. It 
will be recalled that many in the military felt and still feel that the publication 
by Senator Goldwater of Rules of Engagement for part of the Vietnam theatre 
undermined u.S. military efforts there.38 There is, thus, an understandable 
reluctance to publicize this material. On the other hand, its suppression 
decreases the probability of the norms being adopted by the adversary. It 
might be useful for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
to act as a clearinghouse for such material as a way of facilitating 
implementation and reinforcement of this part of the law of armed conflict.39 
III. Military Manuals In Future Constructs 
Alexander Bickel described the heroes among common law judges as those 
who "imagined the past and remembered the future."4O Generals are often 
cautioned against fighting their last war. Likewise, those who playa role in 
defining legal relationships must keep abreast of developing trends and 
technological advances. The probable role of military manuals in future 
conflicts is a question as perplexing as that of how the next battle will be 
fought. 
Many futures can be imagined; in each, the role and degree of effectiveness 
of military manuals will vary. In many, however, it would seem that effective 
dissemination, which is favorably measured by tbe criteria laid out earlier, 
will have some mitigating effect on the harshness and cruelty of warfare. 
Technological advances and the melange of future conflicts may be significant 
factors affecting the impact of manuals on the law of warfare. Dissemination 
needs must be constantly reconsidered in light of these concerns. 
Burgeoning technologies can significantly increase or decrease the number 
of actors necessary to perpetrate an act of violence. It is unlikely that the 
role of the individual rifleman will ever become obsolescent, but an increase 
in irregular warfare can vastly increase the numbers of willing and unwilling 
combatants and, as it were, consumers of the law of armed combat. At the 
same time, however, each technological advance can also significantly reduce 
the number of individual entities who need be concerned with the full range 
of the rules of warfare. As more sophisticat,ed and efficient radars, targeting 
systems, sensing devices and weapon delivery systems are developed, 
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battlefield decisions become more concentrated at higher echelons. This is 
especially true at sea where improved combat information systems allow 
centralized control of myriad weapon systems. Manuals that are to be 
continuously relevant will need to focus on the type of decisions made at these 
levels. 
Concurrent with increased efficiency and destructiveness, modem weapon 
systems tend toward increasing the physical distance and reducing the 
psychological linkages between the initiator of violence and its recipient. As 
victims become more remote, the effect of the principle of chivalry declines 
as an influence on conduct,41 and humanitarian law receives less assistance 
from other cultural restraints on human behavior. The task of constraining 
warfare becomes more difficult. Prescribers must make themselves cognizant 
of the effects of such latent pathologies in technology-assisted decision-
making if effective humanitarian norms are to be crafted and maintained. 
A related factor affecting future combat is likely to be the development 
of advanced rapid communication systems. As observed in recent U.S. 
engagements,42 modem communication systems drastically reduce battlefield 
decision-making, proportionately diminishing the need for field manuals, 
while pushing manual requirements "upstairs. "43 
On the other hand, the centrality of command and control in modem 
warfare will certainly make communications a preferred early target. Current 
strategies must consider the likelihood that adversaries will make every 
attempt to disrupt communications.44 The same prudence demanded tactically 
must be observed when considering the effect of contingencies on observance 
of international law. Additionally, commanders' handbooks and manuals can 
serve to prepare leaders for contingencies which implicate international law. 
While a decision regarding neutral shipping, for example, may indeed be made 
at higher levels than that of the on-site commanding officer, prior training 
and familiarity with the manual may trigger an awareness of potential 
international law problems. Thus, even if the manual is not explicitly used 
as a reference to resolve a problem or question, it precipitates an identification 
of the issue which can be transmitted to higher echelons or used in split-second 
decisions.45 
The most unpredictable construct regarding international norms is the 
twentieth century phenomenon of "total war." Partly a product of 
technological advances, recent wars have entailed an element of totality 
involving both mass participation and mass destruction. The ravages of the 
First World War led nations to renounce war entirely with the Kellogg-
Briand Pact,46 but they also highlighted the negative effects oflosing. While 
total war may not have total winners, it can have total losers. Thus, a curious 
irony ensues. The current law of armed conflict has been framed by parties 
who have rejected warfare in general. Yet, when and if they do ever go to 
war, their interest in winning will be compelling, to say the least. 
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The potential severity of defeat in modem conflicts aggravates the 
compliance problem. Indeed the advent of total warfare has spelled for several 
theorists the death of jus in bello.47 To some, the psychopathic character of 
von Clausewitz's statement, "[tJo introduce the principle of modernization 
into the theory of war itself would always lead to logical absurdity," is 
elevated to normality in total war scenarios.48 When loss could mean national 
extinction, it is reasonable to assume that elites will reconsider past 
agreements or decisions which are strategically limiting. In an absolute 
conflict, a specific norm will rarely be attributed as much importance as 
winning.49 
While key components of jus in bello seem likely to be an early casualty 
on the battlefield, effective multilateral dissemination could serve to preserve 
some lasting import for rules of warfare. Elites might understandably choose 
to reject customary rules during a given conflict, but their ability to do so 
is severely reduced once the rules have been effectively promulgated as we 
described earlier. By the time a conflict escalates to such a level that elites 
might consider abandoning norms, manuals will have been used for planning 
and training, and the norms they establish will have been internalized by the 
military and civilian components of the community. 50 The costs of attempting 
to change those norms will have been raised. 
All putative future legal constraints must take .account of reciprocity. If 
a given adversary does not demonstrate reciprocal compliance with rules of 
warfare, pressure to abandon norms is likely to come from the combatants 
themselves. Similarly, the perceived content of the law of armed conflict 
could quickly change if one were losing a large-scale war with an adversary 
which had not adopted reciprocal normative constraints. Hence the effect 
of military manuals may depend not only on the nature of the conflict but 
the identity and behavior of the adversary. 
In these future constructs, the target of dissemination shifts "upward" to 
a few relatively senior leaders. In such an environment, the utility of manuals 
both in effectuating and in making law may be greatly diminished. Accepted 
norms will not incorporate the stability of wide-spread dissemination, and 
secondary constraints will only be effective as they operate on elites. The 
effect of domestic systems of enforcement and inherent constraints will be 
low and, in a total war setting, the motivation to violate norms may be high. 
Assurance of reciprocity, then, must come not through promises of non-use 
but through more measurable agreements, e.g. verifiable disarmament,51 or 
imaginative new schemes such as programming norms into weapon targeting 
systems. 
The design of manuals for the total war construct is not the end of inquiry; 
h . I " d fl· " . d f" " " f:: " t e terffilno ogy, arme con lct, mstea 0 war or warrare, suggests 
that a certain number of future conflicts are expected to be limited in scope 
and conducted in the context of routine peaceful activities or as protracted, 
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low intensity be11igerencies.~2 Extended troop-intensive counter-insurgencies 
must also be considered as well as limited reprisals and antiterrorist activities. 
The resurgence of circumscribed reprisal/self-defense initiatives seen in 
recent years53 provide limited opportunities for actual field reference to 
manuals due to the above mentioned nature of command and control. 
Similarly, specialized antiterrorist or rescue operations are likely to be 
specifically and thoroughly planned so as to obviate the need for referencing 
a manual of international norms. Therefore, it is all the more urgent to 
incox:p..orate a manual of appropriate norms in the formative and training 
processes. Manuals will only have value in these conflicts if the norms they 
contain have been internalized before the fact. 
Guerrilla warfare and other forms of combat which may be extended in 
time but limited in scope, could prove to be most suited for effective use 
of military manuals. 54 In guerilla warfare, decision-making, by necessity, must 
be delegated; the proliferation of inevitable personal contacts gives rise to 
the kinds of situations most appropriately addressed in manuals and other 
disseminations.55 Unfortunately, this type of combat situation is not 
adequately addressed by current conventions and treaties.56 
In all of the constructs outlined above, the effectiveness of military manuals 
depends on two conditions: (i) dissemination and internalization of the norms 
prior to the fact, and (ii) reciprocity. The current focus should be on thoroughly 
incorporating international norms into planning and training exercises so that 
they will not be quickly jettisoned in combat. Moreover, we must "remember 
the future" and consider new schemes for effectively ensuring reciprocal 
observance in the evolving social organization of armed conflict. 
Conclusion 
Manuals are not an end in themselves. They are an instrument for achieving 
an end: the prescription and application of a law of armed conflict which 
tempers the harshness and cruelty of combat and confmes human and material 
destruction to targets of military necessity and utility. 
Conflict is a social organization which requires a great deal of subjective 
and objective symmetry between the antagonists if the conflict is to be 
conducted in normatively authorized ways. The lower the level of subjective 
and objective symmetry, the more difficult it will be to establish and make 
effective norms regarding how armed conflict is to be conducted. Hence one 
will find in the socio-political situation the ultimate limits for lawmaking 
in this regard. 
The point is of moment in any consideration of the possibilities of the 
contemporary law of war. It is ironic that perspectives of how civilized 
peoples are supposed to fight are relatively homogenous within alliances and, 
formal documents notwithstanding, heterogeneous as between manifest and 
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latent antagonists. The differences loom increasingly large in confrontations 
between the West and Fundamentalist Islamic groups, for the latter draw 
upon a history that has authorized and justified terror as a legitimate weapon 
for an expanded notion of self-defense. Information available about the 
training academies for terrorists in Iran suggest a functional manual, diverging 
widely from that common in western military organizations.57 Part of the 
contemporary war against terrorism is, in fact, a war of manuals, in which 
coercion is being used to make adversaries fight "civilized." The outcome 
of this war is far from certain. If it is lost, future manuals will look quite 
different from the one reviewed in this volume. The implications for national 
values and domestic political processes could be grave. 
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